Sued If You Do, Sued If You Don't: Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act as a Defense to
Race-Conscious Districting
CarolineA. Wongt
INTRODUCTION

Suppose that you work on a state legislative committee
charged with drafting maps of your state's electoral districts.
Recently, constituents have contacted their representatives in
the legislature to complain that the current district lines significantly dilute the influence of minority votes in some areas of the
state. The constituents demand a change and warn that, in the
event that no change is made, they will bring a lawsuit against
the state under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.1 After
studying the relevant law, your committee agrees that the current district plan may contravene § 2, which prohibits states
from adopting plans that result in minority-vote dilution. 2 To
avoid litigation, your committee decides to draft a new district
plan to remedy the § 2 violation. In choosing a strategy for drafting the remedial plan, your committee decides that it must account for racial demographics. After all, a strictly race-neutral
methodology might fail to effectively correct the § 2 violation, or
it might inadvertently give rise to a separate § 2 violation in an3
other part of the state.
But pursuing a race-conscious approach may be no better
than jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire. 4 The
t BM 2012, Indiana University-Bloomington; JD Candidate 2016, The University
of Chicago Law School.
1
Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, 437, codified as amended at 52 USC § 10301.
2
52 USC § 10301. See also Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 46-51 (1986).
3
Section 2 liability attaches whenever a state's district plan results in vote dilution, regardless of whether state actors intended to dilute votes or consciously considered
racial demographics when drafting the plan. See Gingles, 478 US at 43-44.
4
See Laurentius Abstemius, The Fishes and the Frying Pan,in Roger L'Estrange,

ed, Fables of Aesop and Other Eminent Mythologists: With Morals and Reflexions 289,
289 (printed for Sare, et al, 5th ed 1708) ("A Cook was Frying a Dish of Live Fish, and so
soon as ever they felt the Heat of the Pan. There's no Enduring of This, cry'd one, and so
they all Leapt into the Fire; and instead of Mending the Matter, they were Worse now
than Before.").
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problem is that while race-conscious remedial districting may
avert litigation over a § 2 violation, it simultaneously opens the
door to a lawsuit in which the remedial plan may be challenged
as an unconstitutional racial classification under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.' A state that finds itself
potentially in violation of § 2 is thus placed in a seemingly "impossible position."6 Whether it decides to forgo or pursue raceconscious remedial districting, the state leaves itself exposed to
liability for violating either § 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the
Equal Protection Clause, respectively.
In an effort to resolve this predicament, a few states have
responded to equal protection racial gerrymandering challenges
by arguing that compliance with § 2 constitutes an affirmative
defense against claims of race-conscious districting. Whether
such a § 2 defense is legally cognizable, however, is a question
that remains unresolved. The issue of the defense's viability has
been raised twice before the United States Supreme Court, but
both times the justices have expressly declined to address it. As
a result, state governments-as well as courtss and districtinglitigation plaintiffs--have been left without answers to critical
questions about the extent to which § 2 requires, justifies, or
forbids the incorporation of race-conscious principles in the design of electoral districts. Thus, on the question whether § 2 necessitates or permits race-conscious districting, Alabama Solicitor General Andrew Brasher spoke for many when he confessed
during oral argument in a recent racial gerrymandering case: "I
5 US Const Amend XIV, § 2. See also, for example, Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900,
917, 928 (1995) (striking down a district plan under the Equal Protection Clause on the
grounds that race had been the predominant factor motivating the plan's design).
6

League of United Latin American Citizens v Perry, 548 US 399, 518 (2006)

(Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing the
dilemma that a state faces when it must choose between compliance with the Voting
Rights Act and compliance with the Equal Protection Clause).
7 See Shaw v Hunt, 517 US 899, 915 (1996); Bush v Vera, 517 US 952, 977 (1996)
(O'Connor) (plurality).
8 When a court strikes down a state's district plan, it may become responsible for
redrawing that state's district lines by judicial order. In fulfilling that responsibility,
courts have a direct interest in knowing the extent to which § 2 requires or permits raceconscious districting because courts too must avoid redistricting in a manner that violates the Voting Rights Act or the Equal Protection Clause. See Abrams v Johnson, 521
US 74, 79 (1997), citing Upham v Seamon, 456 US 37, 43 (1982).
9 Districting-litigation plaintiffs sometimes propose remedial district plans for
adoption by judicial order; thus, they also have an interest in the resolution of these is-

sues. See, for example, Georgia State Conference of the NAACP v Fayette County Board of
Commissioners, 950 F Supp 2d 1294, 1303 (ND Ga 2013) (questioning the extent to
which the plaintiffs' proposed remedial district plan could permissibly account for race).
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really honestly do not know how Section 2 would necessarily
apply."10
Given the frequency of districting litigation," questions
about the proper application of § 2 demand resolution. This
Comment endeavors to answer those questions. Part I canvasses
the legislative history of § 2 and provides an overview of the doctrinal frameworks governing federal claims of vote dilution and
racial gerrymandering. Part II examines the various attempts
that states have made to raise the § 2 defense in response to racial gerrymandering and state constitutional claims. Finally,
Part III argues that § 2 indeed offers a legally cognizable defense against claims of racial districting, for both doctrinal and
normative reasons. It then envisages how courts could apply the
§ 2 defense in a way that would benefit states raising the defense in good faith but filter out states merely seeking to evade
liability for unjustifiable race-based action. In light of the defense's application in the contexts of vote dilution and racial gerrymandering, Part III also explains that states might avoid violations of both § 2 and the Equal Protection Clause by creating
racially integrated coalitional districts.
I. SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND RACIALDISTRICTING CLAIMS
Hailed on the day of its enactment as "a triumph for freedom," 12 the Voting Rights Act of 196513 has indelibly remolded
the election-law landscape over the past five decades. Section 2
of the Act, aimed at dismantling racially discriminatory state
voting practices, has become the font of a robust and complex
body of law governing electoral districting. Proceeding in two
sections, this Part begins by situating the Voting Rights Act
within the context of the civil rights movement and detailing the

10 Transcript of Oral Argument, Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v Alabama,
Docket No 13-895, *60 (US Nov 12, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 5844290).
11 As of January 1, 2015, redistricting in the wake of the 2010 United States Census has prompted districting litigation in forty-two states, including racial-districting
litigation in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
and Wisconsin. For a database collecting information about this litigation, see generally Litigation in the 2010 Cycle (Loyola Law School-LA), archived at http://perma.cc/YJ
4S-RYXV (tracking the proceedings of districting litigation nationwide).
12 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the Signing of
the Voting Rights Act, 1965 Pub Papers 840, 840.
13 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, codified as amended at 52 USC § 10101 et seq.
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legislative history of § 2. It then surveys the development of case
law concerning federal racial-districting claims under both § 2
14
and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
A.

The Background and Legislative History of § 2

In the United States, voting rights have often been closely
intertwined with issues of race. The right to vote free of racebased restrictions was constitutionalized in 1870 by the Fifteenth Amendment,15 the ratification of which was driven in
part by the need to protect African Americans' voting rights in
the wake of the Civil War.16 Later voting-rights legislation was
enacted concurrently with the development of the African American civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s.17 The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 itself arose directly from the advocacy efforts
of civil rights activists's and aimed to dislodge state voting practices that tended to disenfranchise minority voters, such as literacy tests and poll taxes. 19
Section 2 is the centerpiece of the Voting Rights Act. In its
originally enacted version, § 2 prohibited states from imposing
any "standard, practice or procedure ... to deny or abridge the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color."20 This language closely tracked that of the Fifteenth Amendment, which broadly decrees that "[t]he right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.21

14 Throughout this Comment, the term "racial-districting claims" is used to refer
broadly to all claims that challenge districts as racially discriminatory, whether premised on § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Equal Protection Clause, or both.
15 US Const Amend XV, § 1.
16 See Emma C. Jordan, The Future of the Fifteenth Amendment, 28 Howard L J

541, 546-48 (1985).
17 See Civil Rights Act of 1957 § 131, Pub L No 85-315, 71 Stat 634, 637-38, codified as amended at 52 USC § 10101; Civil Rights Act of 1960 § 601, Pub L No 86-449, 74
Stat 86, 90-92, codified as amended at 52 USC § 10101. For a comprehensive historical
account of the African American civil rights movement, see generally Peter B. Levy, The
Civil Rights Movement (Greenwood 1998).
18 See Gary May, Bending toward Justice: The Voting Rights Act and the Transformation of American Democracy 48, 148 (Basic Books 2013).
19 See Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence,75 U Chi L Rev 1493, 1496-98 (2008).
20 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 79 Stat at 437.
21 US Const Amend XV, § 1.
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In the first two decades after its enactment, disenfranchised
plaintiffs rarely relied on § 2.22 Instead, voting-rights cases during that period were almost always brought under the Reconstruction Amendments or under alternative provisions of the
Voting Rights Act.23 But the tides began to turn in 1980 when
the Supreme Court heard its first § 2 vote dilution case-City of
Mobile, Alabama v Bolden24-and issued a decision that threatened to severely restrain the potential strength of § 2's protections. In Bolden, a plurality of the justices held that because
§ 2's language "no more than elaborate[d] upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment,25 a plaintiff could establish a § 2 violation
only by proving that a state had adopted a given voting practice
with an intent to discriminate on the basis of race. 26 Requiring
proof of such intent placed an enormous burden on plaintiffs
seeking to challenge voting practices as racially discriminatory,
and this aspect of Bolden accordingly garnered "a firestorm of
criticism and protest in the legal community."27
In reaction to Bolden, Congress amended § 2 to prohibit the
use of any "standard, practice, or procedure ... which results in
a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race," thereby abrogating Bolden's
intent requirement and bolstering the robustness of § 2's protections.28 Congress's post-Bolden amendments further specify that
state practices may not cause racial minorities to have "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."
The amendments also instruct courts to employ a totality-of-thecircumstances test to ascertain whether a given state practice

See Cox and Miles, 75 U Chi L Rev at 1497 (cited in note 19).
See id. See also, for example, Allen v State Board of Elections, 393 US 544, 55354 (1969) (involving voting-rights claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment and
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
24 446 US 55 (1980).
25 Id at 60 (Stewart) (plurality).
26 Id at 60-62 (Stewart) (plurality).
27 Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in
22
23

Chandler Davidson, ed, Minority Vote Dilution 85, 100-01 (Howard 1989). See also Voting Rights Act Extension, S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 16 (1982), reprinted in
1982 USCCAN 177, 196 (denouncing the Court's decision in Bolden for "plac[ing] an unacceptably difficult burden on plaintiffs").
28 Act of 1982 § 3, Pub L No 97-205, 96 Stat 131, 134, codified at 52 USC § 10301
(emphasis added).
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violates § 2.29 As demonstrated in the next Section, racialdistricting litigation under § 2 has proliferated widely since the
addition of these amendments.
B.

Bringing a Racial-Districting Claim: The Prima Facie Case

Under federal law, a plaintiff has two avenues for challenging a state's district plan as racially discriminatory. First, she
can bring suit under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and allege that
the plan results in the unlawful dilution of minority votes. 30 Second, she can bring suit under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause and allege that the plan is an unconstitutional gerrymander designed predominantly on the basis of
racial considerations. 31 The legal regimes governing each of
these claims are "analytically distinct"32 and are discussed in
turn in this Section.
1. Vote dilution claims under § 2.
To establish a prima facie case of minority-vote dilution under § 2, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the relevant minority
group is "sufficiently large and geographically compact" to feasibly constitute a numerical majority of the citizen voting-age
population in a single-member legislative district, (2) the minority group is "politically cohesive," and (3) the majority group in
the relevant geographic region "votes sufficiently as a bloc" to
defeat the minority group's preferred political candidates. 33
Nicknamed "the Gingles preconditions" after the seminal case

29 Act of 1982 § 3, 96 Stat at 134. The amendments also clarify, however, that § 2
does not require states to ensure that minority candidates are elected in numbers proportional to their states' minority populations. Act of 1982 § 3, 96 Stat at 134.
30 See, for example, Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 34-35 (1986).
31 See, for example, Hunt v Cromartie,526 US 541, 543 (1999). In theory, plaintiffs
also have the option of using the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for constitutional
vote dilution claims. See, for example, Rogers v Lodge, 458 US 613, 617, 627 (1982) (affirming the district court's finding that a challenged district plan diluted minority votes
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). Such claims, however, have historically been
unsuccessful and have fallen out of fashion since 1982, when Congress broadened the
scope of § 2 in response to Bolden. See, for example, White v Regester, 412 US 755, 763
(1973) (rejecting the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment vote dilution claim); Whitcomb v
Davis, 403 US 124, 157-60 (1971) (same).
32 Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630, 652 (1993) ("Shaw I").
33 Gingles, 478 US at 50-51, 63. See also Bartlett v Strickland, 556 US 1, 14, 18-19
(2009) (Kennedy) (plurality) (clarifying that a "numerical majority" is defined as 50 percent or more of the citizen voting-age population in the relevant geographic area for purposes of the first of these three requirements).
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Thornburg v Gingles34 these three evidentiary requirements
speak to causation; without them, minority voters cannot show
'
that a challenged district plan "result[ed] in ...abridgement 5
36
of their right to vote within the meaning of § 2.
After establishing the Gingles preconditions, a plaintiff
must also demonstrate that the totality of the circumstances
substantiates the alleged dilutive effects of the challenged
plan. 37 In weighing the totality of the circumstances, courts typically consider the seven factors set forth by the Senate Judiciary
Committee in a report accompanying the post-Bolden amendments to § 2: (1) the history of discriminatory voting-related
practices in the relevant state; (2) whether voting in the state is
"racially polarized"; (3) whether the state has used "voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group"; (4) whether minorities
have been denied access to "candidate slating process[es]";
(5) whether minorities "bear the effects of discrimination in such
areas as education, employment, and health"; (6) whether political campaigns in the state make "racial appeals"; and
(7) whether minorities "have been elected to public office in the
jurisdiction."38 The Senate report also lists two other factors of
secondary significance: whether elected officials in the state
tend to be unresponsive to the "particularized needs" of minority
groups, and whether the policies offered to justify the state's allegedly discriminatory voting practices are merely "tenuous."39
Several legal theories are available to a plaintiff seeking
to bring a vote dilution claim. In particular, three distinct theories of vote dilution have emerged from the case law: vote
478 US 30 (1986).
52 USC § 10301(a).
36 See Gingles, 478 US at 50 n 17 ("Unless minority voters possess the potential to
elect representatives in the absence of the challenged structure of practice, they cannot
claim to have been injured by that structure or practice.") (emphasis omitted).
37 See Johnson v De Grandy, 512 US 997, 1010-12 (1994); Voinovich v Quilter, 507
US 146, 157 (1993). See also 52 USC § 10301(b) (providing that a § 2 violation is established if it is shown by a "totality of the circumstances" that "members of a [racial] class
of citizens ... have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice").
38 Gingles, 478 US at 36-37, quoting S Rep No 97-417 at 28-29 (cited in note 27).
39 Gingles, 478 US at 37, quoting S Rep No 97-417 at 29 (cited in note 27). In sum,
the totality-of-the-circumstances test grants judges significant analytical flexibility and
has the potential to vary widely in application from court to court. One empirical study
indicates that the precise manner in which a judge assesses the totality of the circumstances in this context may depend heavily on his or her individual political ideology or
race. See Cox and Miles, 75 U Chi L Rev at 1519-24, 1535-36 (cited in note 19).
34

35
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subsumption, vote fragmentation, and vote packing. Discussed
in turn below, each theory of vote dilution has been at issue in
at least one case arising before the Supreme Court in recent
decades.
a) Vote subsumption. One of the earliest forms of vote dilution recognized by the Supreme Court, vote subsumption occurs when a state draws a large multimember legislative district
as an alternative to smaller single-member districts in a way
that ensures that minority voters in the relevant geographic area will remain politically weak.40 The designation of an electoral
district as "multimember" or "single-member" refers to the number of representatives that are elected at large from within the
district. 41 In particular, a multimember district employs a system by which several members of the legislature are elected
simultaneously, whereas a single-member district involves a
voting scheme in which only one legislative representative is
elected from the district. 42 Accordingly, a multimember district
can engender minority-vote dilution whenever it is large enough
to overwhelm the voting preferences of small minority communities that would have otherwise held politically influential majorities or pluralities in a system of single-member districts.
Gingles itself involved allegations of vote subsumption. The
plaintiffs challenged six multimember state legislative districts
in North Carolina as precipitating this type of vote dilution in
violation of § 2. 43 The plaintiffs argued that the state's "decision
to employ multimember, rather than single-member, districts in
the contested jurisdictions dilute[d] [African American] votes by
submerging them in a white majority, thus impairing [the plaintiffs'] ability to elect representatives of their choice." 44 After formulating the three preconditions that would thereafter govern
all § 2 vote dilution claims, the Court reviewed the district
court's factual findings for clear error and concluded that the
challenged districts resulted in unlawful vote dilution.45 The application of the three Gingles preconditions, however, has since
been expanded beyond the vote-subsumption context and
See Gingles, 478 US at 46.
See John F. Banzhaf III, Multi-member Electoral Districts-Do They Violate the
"One Man, One Vote" Principle,75 Yale L J 1309, 1309 (1966).
42
See Douglas J. Amy, Behind the Ballot Box: A Citizen's Guide to Voting Systems
40

41

67-68 (Praeger 2000).
43 Gingles, 478 US at 34-35.
44 Id at 46.
45 Id at 80.
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transported into the Court's analyses of vote-fragmentation and
vote-packing claims as well.
b) Vote fragmentation. A district plan can also effect vote
dilution by carving a geographically compact minority community into two or more fragments and then allocating those fragments across multiple districts, whether multimember or single
member.46 The dilutive mechanism of vote fragmentation is similar to that of vote subsumption: both submerge racial minorities
within electoral districts in a way that prevents their voting
preferences from meaningfully influencing political processes.
Colloquially, vote fragmentation has been termed "cracking,"
which the Supreme Court has defined as "the splitting of a
group or party among several districts to deny that group or
party a majority in any of those districts."47
The first Supreme Court cases to apply the Gingles framework to vote-fragmentation claims were Growe v Emison4s and
Johnson v De Grandy.49 In Emison, the plaintiffs alleged that congressional and state legislative districts in Minneapolis had diluted minority votes by "needlessly fragment[ing] two Indian reservations and divid[ing] the minority population of Minneapolis"
when the members of that population could have instead been
grouped into a single, cohesive district. 50 Similarly, in De
Grandy, black and Hispanic voters challenged a Florida district
plan on the grounds that it "unlawfully fragment[ed] cohesive
minority communities" in the Miami-Dade County area into
separate single-member districts.51 Though both the Emison and
De Grandy plaintiffs prevailed in their respective district
courts, 52 the Supreme Court ultimately rejected both sets of
claims. In Emison, the Court held that the district court had

46 See, for example, League of United Latin American Citizens v Perry, 548 US 399,
423-27 (2006) ("LULAC"); Growe v Emison, 507 US 25, 28 (1993); De Grandy, 512 US at
1000-02.
47
Vieth v Jubelirer,541 US 267, 286 n 7 (2004) (Scalia) (plurality).
48 507 US 25 (1993).

49

512 US 997 (1994).

50

Emison, 507 US at 28.
De Grandy, 512 US at 1000-02 (quotation marks omitted).
Emison v Growe, 782 F Supp 427, 439-40, 448 (D Minn 1992) (three-judge pan-

51
52

el), revd and remd,.Emison, 507 US 25; De Grandy v Wetherell, 815 F Supp 1550, 1574,
1580 (ND Fla 1992) (three-judge panel), affd in part and revd in part, De Grandy, 512
US 997. Federal circuit court precedent in this area of law is relatively scarce because
cases involving challenges to electoral districts may be appealed directly from the federal
district courts to the United States Supreme Court. See 28 USC §§ 1253, 2284; 52 USC
§ 10303(a)(5).
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clearly erred in finding that the second and third Gingles preconditions had been satisfied, because the record "contain[ed] no
statistical evidence of minority political cohesion ... or of majority bloc voting."' 3 Likewise, in De Grandy, the Court avoided a
conclusive analysis of the three Gingles preconditions but held
that the totality-of-the-circumstances factors weighed in the
state's favor.54 In reaching this conclusion, the Court chiefly relied on minority voters' documented ability to form effective voting majorities in numbers roughly proportional to their respective shares of the citizen voting-age population in the MiamiDade County area. 55
The next major vote-fragmentation case to reach the Supreme Court did not come until over a decade after Emison and
De Grandy, when the Court heard League of United Latin American Citizens v Perry56 ("LULAC") in 2006. In LULAC, the plaintiffs alleged that a Texas congressional district plan had diluted
the strength of the Latino vote through vote fragmentation. 57 In
contrast to its findings in Emison and De Grandy, the Court in
LULAC expressly held that all three Gingles preconditions had
been satisfied, both because Latinos had constituted a citizen
voting-age majority in the challenged district prior to the plan's
enactment and because there was substantial evidence of racially polarized voting within that district.58 The Court further held
that the totality of the circumstances corroborated the plaintiffs'
vote dilution claim. 59 In particular, the Court pointed to the history of voting discrimination in Texas, the disproportionately
low number of Texas congressional districts in which Latinos
composed a citizen voting-age majority, and the incumbent representatives' unresponsiveness to Latinos' "particularized" political interests.60
c) Vote packing. Perhaps the least commonly recognized
theory of vote dilution, vote packing occurs when a district plan
crowds an artificially high number of minority voters into a single district, thereby preventing their votes from meaningfully

Emison, 507 US at 41 (quotation marks omitted).
De Grandy, 512 US at 1008-09.
65
Id at 1013-15.
56 548 US 399 (2006).
57 Id at 423-27.
58 Id at 427-28.
59 Idat 442.
60 LULAC, 548 US at 438-40 (quotation marks omitted).
53
54
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influencing election outcomes in other districts.1 In other words,
"'[p]acking' refers to the practice of filling a district with a su-

permajority of a given group or party."62
Voinovich v Quilter63 was the first case in which the Supreme Court addressed a § 2 vote-packing claim.64 In that case,
the plaintiffs challenged eight of Ohio's state legislative districts
on the grounds that African American voters had been disproportionately packed into those districts in a way that considerably diminished the political influence they would otherwise have
wielded across other districts.65 The Court disposed of the case
for the same reason that it had ruled in favor of the state defendants in Emison: the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the Gingles
preconditions because the record lacked evidence that voting
patterns in Ohio were racially polarized.66
Vote subsumption, vote fragmentation, and vote packing are
not the only theories available to a plaintiff seeking to strike
down a district plan as racially discriminatory. Alternatively, a
plaintiff may separately advance an equal protection theory of
unlawful racial districting, as the next Section explains.
2. Racial gerrymandering claims under the Equal
Protection Clause.
In addition to challenging the legality of district plans under
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act, plaintiffs may challenge district
plans as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. The prototypical equal protection districting claim alleges racial gerrymandering, which courts have
defined as "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district
boundaries and populations for partisan or personal political
purposes."67 The theory underlying such a claim is that a
state's intentional use of race as the basis for sorting voters into districts relies on harmful stereotypes and segregates voters
in a manner incompatible with the Fourteenth Amendment's

61
62
63
64

See, for example, Quilter, 507 US at 149-51.
Vieth, 541 US at 286 n 7 (Scalia) (plurality).
507 US 146 (1993).
Id at 149-50. Note that vote-packing claims have also been referred to as

"influence-dilution claims." Id at 154.
65 Id at 149-50.
66 See id at 158.
67 Davis v Bandemer, 478 US 109, 164 (1986), quoting Kirkpatrick v Preisler, 394
US 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas concurring).
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guarantee of equal protection under the law.68 As such, any district plan that is intentionally designed in accordance with raceconscious principles-including but not limited to plans that
result in vote subsumption, vote fragmentation, or vote packing9--may be susceptible to an equal protection challenge.
To prevail on an equal protection claim of racial gerrymandering, a plaintiff must prove that race was the "predominant"
motivation for the challenged district's design by showing that
the state subordinated traditional, judicially recognized districting principles to racial considerations. 0 Such traditional districting principles include compactness, 71 contiguity, and respect for
communities that are defined by shared political interests73
Plaintiffs may attempt to expose a departure from these principles by showing that districts have relatively "bizarre" shapes74
They can also use computer algorithms and modeling software
to demonstrate that districts are homogeneous with respect to
race but not with respect to other community characteristics.7 5
If a plaintiff successfully makes a prima facie showing of racial gerrymandering, the court then evaluates whether the district plan survives strict scrutiny.76 One of the most demanding
forms of judicial review, strict scrutiny requires a court to inquire whether a challenged state law furthers a "compelling interest" and is "narrowly tailored" to further that interest 77 If the

68 See Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 911-12 (1995). See also Richard H. Pildes and
Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "BizarreDistricts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating
Election-District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich L Rev 483, 506-09 (1993)
(characterizing the injury caused by racial gerrymanders as an "expressive harm").
69 See Part I.B.1 (elaborating on these three types of race-conscious districting).
70 Johnson, 515 US at 916.
71 See Note, Reapportionment, 79 Harv L Rev 1228, 1285 (1966) ("[The compactness of a legislative district can be measured by determining the extent to which its area
deviates from the area of the smallest circle that completely circumscribes the district.").
For attempts to more rigorously define "compactness" using various quantitative approaches, see Pildes and Niemi, 92 Mich L Rev at 553-69 (cited in note 68); Nicholas 0.
Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 Harv L Rev 1903, 1967-80 (2012).
72 See Note, 79 Harv L Rev at 1284 (cited in note 71) ("A contiguous district is one
in which a person can go from any point within the district to any other point without
leaving the district.").
73 See Johnson, 515 US at 916.
74 Bush v Vera, 517 US 952, 979 (1996) (O'Connor) (plurality).
75 See Micah Altman and Michael McDonald, The Promise and Perils of Computers
in Redistricting, 5 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol 69, 72-79 (2010) (describing the role of
computer software in modern electoral-districting processes).
76 See, for example, Shaw I, 509 US at 644; Johnson, 515 US at 913-14.
77
16B Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law § 862 at 316-17 (2009). See also Stephen A.
Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 Am J
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government cannot convince the court that the state law at issue
satisfies both prongs of strict scrutiny review, then the court
must strike down the law as unconstitutional.78 Thus, when
strict scrutiny is triggered in the racial gerrymandering context,
a challenged district plan will stand only if the state can show
that the plan was narrowly tailored to advance some compelling
79
government interest.
The legal regimes governing equal protection and § 2 claims
thus differ in two noteworthy respects. First, a plaintiff bringing
an equal protection claim must prove that state officials intentionally considered race when designing the district plan at issue. 80 In contrast, Congress's post-Bolden amendments to the
Voting Rights Act ensured that intent need not be proven as an
element of a § 2 claim. 8' Accordingly, at least in this respect, a
plaintiff will bear a heavier burden of proof if she chooses to
challenge a district plan under the Equal Protection Clause instead of under § 2.82 On the other hand, an equal protection challenge does not require an inquiry into the demographic voting
patterns of various racial groups in the relevant jurisdiction.83
Thus, a racial-districting claim that takes the form of an equal
protection challenge may have some advantages over one
brought under § 2, because an equal protection plaintiff does not
need to hurdle the fact-intensive Gingles preconditions or § 2's
totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry to prevail.
Shaw v Reno84 ("Shaw I") was the first case in which the Supreme Court recognized a claim of racial gerrymandering under
the Equal Protection Clause.85 The dispute in Shaw I arose from

Legal Hist 355, 358 (2006) (comparing strict scrutiny to other, more-permissive forms of
judicial review, such as "intermediate scrutiny" and "rationality review").
78
See 16B Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law § 862 at 315-17 (2009).
79 See, for example, Johnson, 515 US at 915; Cromartie,526 US at 543.
80 See, for example, Cromartie,526 US at 546.
81 See text accompanying notes 24-28.
82 This burden, however, is lighter in cases in which districts are particularly egregiously misshaped, because it is easier for the plaintiffs in such cases to convince a court
that district designs are explainable only on racial grounds. See, for example, Figure 1
and text accompanying notes 85-92.
83 See, for example, Shaw I, 509 US at 642-49.
84 509 US 630 (1993).
85 Earlier racial gerrymandering cases were often decided under the Fifteenth
Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. See, for example, Gomillion v
Lightfoot, 364 US 339, 345-48 (1960) (analyzing the constitutionality of racial gerrymanders under the Fifteenth Amendment). The Fourteenth Amendment, however, has
since come to dominate the arena of voting-rights litigation because the Court has come
to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting a category of voting-rights claims
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a redistricting plan in North Carolina that created two majorityminority districts to give greater effect to the votes of African
American citizens.86 A majority-minority district is an electoral
district in which a group that is nationally a racial or ethnic minority comprises a majority of the citizen voting-age population.87 In Shaw I, white voters in North Carolina challenged the
majority-minority districts at issue as racial classifications violative of the Equal Protection Clause. 8s The case reached the Supreme Court on the threshold question whether the plaintiffs
had stated an equal protection claim capable of surviving the
state defendants' motion to dismiss.89 The Court answered this
question in the affirmative, reasoning that the shapes of the
challenged districts "[could not] be understood as anything other
than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the
basis of race."90 Consequently, it remanded the case with instructions for the district court to engage in strict scrutiny review of the challenged districts.91 The shapes of those districts,
Districts 1 and 12, are depicted below in Figure 1.92 Both districts appear in black on the map and are readily describable as
94
so "bizarre 93 that they are "irrational on [their] face."

(including vote dilution claims) that is broader than that prohibited by the Fifteenth
Amendment. See Shaw I, 509 US at 640-45 (tracing the history of Gomillion and subsequent related cases to explain the Shaw I Court's decision to evaluate racial gerrymandering under the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Fifteenth Amendment); Samuel
Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, and Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal
Structure of the PoliticalProcess 15 (Foundation 4th ed 2012) (describing the Equal Protection Clause as "[tihe major source of constitutional voting rights litigation").
86
Shaw I, 509 US at 633-34.
See Strickland, 556 US at 13 (Kennedy) (plurality).
87
Shaw I, 509 US at 636-37.
88
89 Id at 634.
90 Id at 649.
91 Id at 658. Three years after Shaw I was remanded, the case returned to the Supreme Court as Shaw v Hunt, 517 US 899 (1996) ("Shaw II"). For a discussion of Shaw
II, see Part II.A.
92 For an original copy of the map shown in Figure 1, see Shaw I, 509 US at
Appendix.
93 Id at 644.
94 Idat 652.
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FIGURE 1. MAP OF THE DISTRICT PLAN CHALLENGED IN SHAW V

RENO

95
Another racial gerrymandering case, Miller v Johnson,
reached the Court two years later, this time presenting the justices with the question of what constitutes a "compelling state
interest" for purposes of strict scrutiny review of a racial gerrymander.96 The plaintiffs, again a group of white voters, 97 challenged the constitutionality of the Eleventh District of Georgia's
1992 congressional district plan.98 The Court noted that the

Eleventh District was "[g]eographically

... a monstrosity,"

"[e]xtending from Atlanta to the Atlantic" and sprawling across
the state of Georgia to tie together "four discrete, widely spaced
urban centers" that were densely populated by African Americans. 99 Figure 2 shows a map of the Eleventh District's shape
and population density, with the largest dark regions of the map
indicating the locations of the urban areas to which the Court
referred. Figure 3 shows a map of Georgia's entire 1992 congressional district plan, with the Eleventh District appearing at the
map's center and stretching across nearly the entire width of the
state. 100

515 US 900 (1995).
Id at 903-04.
97 See id at 929-30 (Stevens dissenting) (noting the plaintiff-appellants' race).
95

96

98

Id at 909.

99 Johnson, 515 US at 908-09 (quotation marks omitted).
100 For original copies of the maps shown in Figures 2 and 3, see id at Appendices A-B.
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FIGURE 2. POPULATION DENSITY MAP OF THE DISTRICT
CHALLENGED IN MILLER V JOHNSON
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FIGURE 3. MAP OF THE DISTRICT PLAN CHALLENGED IN MILLER V
JOHNSON
Georgia Congressional Districts

APPENDIX A

(1992)

4 ,~-

The DOJ had previously approved the district plan at issue
in Johnson under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, after commanding that the General Assembly of Georgia adopt a plan with the
maximum possible number of majority-black districts.101 The
state defendants accordingly argued that the challenged plan
survived strict scrutiny review on the grounds that the plan's
adoption furthered Georgia's interest in obtaining the DOJ's approval under § 5.102 Rejecting the state defendants' argument,
the Johnson Court decided that compliance with the DOJ's erroneous interpretation of § 5 could not constitute such a compelling interest, because to permit otherwise would "surrender[ ] to
101 Id at 907-09. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires certain states with a
history of discriminatory voting practices to submit proposed changes to their voting
laws to the DOJ for approval prior to enactment. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 79
Stat at 439, 52 USC § 10304. Until recently, § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act prescribed
the formula that determined whether a given state was subject to § 5's requirements.
See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(b), 79 Stat at 438, 52 USC § 10303(b). But in 2013, the
Supreme Court struck down the § 4(b) formula as unconstitutional and thus rendered
§ 5 functionally inoperative. See Shelby County, Alabama v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612,
2631 (2013).
102 See Johnson, 515 US at 920-22.
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the Executive Branch [the Court's] role in enforcing constitutional limits on race-based official action."'103 Consequently, the
Court held that the plan did not survive strict scrutiny and
struck it down as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander violao4
tive of the Equal Protection Clause.
Importantly, § 5 of the Voting Rights Act differs significantly in scope and involves distinct legal issues as compared to § 2.
Section 5 is a mechanism for federal regulation of state voting
practices and thereby implicates the proper scope of federal executive power, whereas § 2 establishes a cause of action that
private parties can use to directly challenge those practices. As
such, the Johnson decision has no direct bearing on the question
whether compliance with § 2 may ever constitute a compelling
interest justifying race-conscious districting.105 That question
therefore remains legally unresolved, even though the Court has
had opportunities to address it in several cases. Part II discusses those cases in further detail.

II. PAST ATTEMPTS TO USE § 2 AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
In response to a number of racial gerrymandering challenges brought in recent decades, states have attempted to defend
their district plans on the grounds that they were strategically
designed to ensure compliance with § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.106 The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly and expressly left unanswered the question whether compliance with
§ 2 can ever provide states with a successful defense against a
racial gerrymandering challenge brought on equal protection
grounds. For example, in the racial gerrymandering case Shaw v
Hunt o7 ("Shaw II"), the majority left the question of the § 2 defense's availability unresolved, writing: "We assume, arguendo,
for the purpose of resolving this suit, that compliance with § 2

103 Id at 922, citing United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 704 (1974), Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 211 (1962), and Cooper
v Aaron, 358 US 1, 18 (1958). Notably, however, four justices later expressed support for
the proposition that compliance with the DOJ's interpretation of § 5 could potentially
qualify as a compelling state interest in other circumstances. See LULAC, 548 US at
518-19 (Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
104 Johnson, 515 US at 920-22, 927-28.
105 See id at 921 (expressly leaving unanswered the question "[wihether or not in
some cases compliance with the [Voting Rights] Act ... can provide a compelling interest" justifying race-conscious districting).
106 See, for example, Bush v Vera, 517 US 952, 976-77 (1996) (O'Connor) (plurality).
107 517 US 899 (1996).
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could be a compelling interest."10 A total of five justices summed
across the plurality and concurring opinions rendered a similar
result in the subsequent racial gerrymandering case Bush v
Vera.109 In Vera, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote on behalf of
a three-justice plurality: "[W]e assume without deciding that
compliance with the [§ 2] results test ... can be a compelling
state interest.110 Likewise, Justice Clarence Thomas stated in a
concurring opinion joined by one other justice that he was "willing to assume without deciding that the State [had] asserted a
compelling interest." '
When the Court treats a legal proposition as assumed but
not decided, that proposition cannot be cited as binding precedent in future cases. 112 Thus, because the Court has expressly
carved out the threshold question of the § 2 defense's viability as
assumed but undecided, it remains an open question whether
the defense can be successfully wielded against an equal protection racial gerrymandering claim. Similarly, whether § 2 can
sustain a defense against a vote dilution claim brought under
§ 2 itself remains unresolved.
This Part begins by discussing the cases in which states
have attempted to raise a § 2 defense to claims of racial gerrymandering. It then analyzes the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Bartlett v Strickland.113 In that case, the state defendants raised
§ 2 as a defense not to a racial gerrymandering claim but rather
to a claim that a district plan violated state election laws under
the state's own constitution.114 Even though Strickland did not
itself involve a racial-districting challenge, the Court's analysis
in that case illuminates several aspects of the § 2 defense's potential viability.
A.

Section 2 as a Defense against Equal Protection Claims

In response to racial gerrymandering claims brought under
the Equal Protection Clause, state defendants have traditionally
108 Id at 915.
109 517 US 952 (1996).
110 Id at 977 (O'Connor) (plurality).
111 Id at 1003 (Thomas concurring).
112 See, for example, National Aeronautics and Space Administration v Nelson, 562
US 134, 163 (2011) (Scalia concurring) (explaining that "stare decisis is simply irrelevant
when the pertinent precedent assumed, without deciding, the existence of a constitutional right").
113 556 US 1 (2009).
114 Id at 7-8 (Kennedy) (plurality).
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focused their litigation resources on attacking the elements of
the plaintiffs' prima facie case, denying that race was the "predominant factor" motivating the design of the district plan in
question.1,5 But in a few cases, states have additionally argued
that, to the extent that racial considerations motivated the design of a given district plan, those considerations were necessary
to avoid a violation of § 2 and were therefore legally justified.
This § 2 defense has surfaced before the United States Supreme
Court in Shaw II and Vera, sister cases that were decided on the
same day.116 In both, the Court expressly declined to address the
threshold question of the § 2 defense's viability.117
Premised on the same dispute underlying Shaw 1,118 Shaw H
presented the Court with the question whether North Carolina's
challenged district plan survived strict scrutiny.119 The state defendants argued that it did, on the grounds that the plan had
been necessary for the state to avoid violating § 2.120 In evaluating the merits of this defense, the Court began by announcing
that it would assume without deciding, "for the purpose of resolving this suit, that compliance with § 2 could be a compelling
interest."121

Operating under this assumption, the Court implic-

itly adopted the district court's reasoning that § 2-if it could
constitute a compelling interest at all-could do so only if the defendants showed that the state would have been in violation of
§ 2 but for the enactment of the challenged plan.122 Doctrinally,
this placed a burden of proof on the defendants identical to the
burden that plaintiffs must bear when making a prima facie
showing of a § 2 violation. That is, the state defendants were required to use the Gingles preconditions and the totality-of-thecircumstances test to establish that the previous district plan
had violated § 2.123
On the facts of Shaw II, the fatal flaw in the state's argument was that the minority group in the challenged district was

115 See, for example, Johnson, 515 US at 916-18; Alabama Legislative Black Caucus
vAlabama, 2015 WL 1310746, *7-8 (US).
116 Shaw II, 517 US at 899; Vera, 517 US at 952.
117 Shaw II, 517 US at 915; Vera, 517 US at 977 (O'Connor) (plurality).
118 For a discussion of Shaw I, see text accompanying notes 84-92.

119 Shaw II, 517 US at 901-02.
120 See State Appellees' Brief, Shaw v Hunt, Docket Nos 94-923, 94-924, *39-49 (US
filed Oct 25, 1995) (available on Westlaw at 1995 WL 632461).
121 Shaw II, 517 US at 915.
122 See id at 914-18.
123 See id at 914-16.
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not sufficiently "geographically compact.124 As a result, the
Court reasoned that the district could not have been successfully
challenged as resulting in vote dilution under § 2, because no
hypothetical plaintiff could have established the first of the
three Gingles preconditions. 125 In turn, because no plaintiff could
have prevailed on a § 2 challenge against the district in question, the state could not assert as a defense that it had "narrowly tailored" that district's boundaries in furtherance of a "compelling state interest" in avoiding a § 2 violation.126 Accordingly,
the Court concluded that North Carolina's district plan did not
127
survive strict scrutiny.
In Vera, five of the justices again deliberately refrained from
deciding whether avoidance of a § 2 violation can ever provide a
defense to a claim of racial gerrymandering, explaining that
they would "assume without deciding that compliance with the
[§ 2] results test ...can be a compelling state interest" for purposes of strict scrutiny review.12s As in Shaw II, the Court in
Vera ultimately held that even with the benefit of this assumption, the district plan at issue could not survive strict scrutiny,
because the challenged district was not geographically compact
1
as required by the first Gingles precondition. 29
O'Connor also authored a separate concurrence in Vera to
express her view that compliance with § 2 should qualify as a
compelling state interest in at least some cases. She reasoned
that "it would be irresponsible for a State to disregard the § 2
results test" in light of the obligations that Congress intended
§ 2 to impose on the states. 130 Notably, some district courts have
latched on to this concurrence as support for the conclusion that
compliance with § 2 may justify a court's use of race-conscious
principles in crafting remedial district plans following a judicial
determination that a state has violated the Voting Rights Act.131
124
125

Id at 916 (quotation marks omitted).
Shaw II, 517 US at 916-17. Recall that the first Gingles precondition requires a

showing that the relevant minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a numerical majority of the citizen voting-age population in a singlemember legislative district. See note 33 and accompanying text.
126 Shaw II, 517 US at 916-17.
127 Id at 902.
128 Vera, 517 US at 977 (O'Connor) (plurality). See also id at 1003 (Thomas concurring).
129 Id at 978-79 (O'Connor) (plurality). See also id at 1003 (Thomas concurring).
130 Id at 991-92 (O'Connor concurring).
131 See Colleton County Council v McConnell, 201 F Supp 2d 618, 639-40 (D SC
2002) (three-judge panel); King v State Board of Elections, 979 F Supp 619, 621-22 (ND
Ill 1997) (three-judge panel).

The University of Chicago Law Review

1680

[82:1659

Most recently, the § 2 defense was raised in the state court
case of Dickson v Rucho.132 In that case, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that § 2 offers state defendants a defense
for race-conscious districting. 133 In finding that compliance with
§ 2 could constitute a compelling state interest for purposes of
strict scrutiny review, the court began by observing that "the
Voting Rights Act creates tension with the Fourteenth Amendment."134 It then proceeded to justify its recognition of the § 2 defense on the grounds that, without the defense's availability, the
state would be unable to lawfully comply with the requirements
of the Voting Rights Act.135 The court also reasoned that the
availability of § 2 as a defense makes pragmatic sense because it
provides states with expanded opportunities to avoid the potentially heavy costs of districting litigation.16 Applying the defense
to the facts before it, the court found in favor of the state defendants because they had "show[n] a strong basis in evidence
that the possibility of a section 2 violation existed" at the time
137
that they had drawn the remedial district plan at issue.
Though O'Connor expressed concerns similar to those raised
in Dickson, those concerns were unable to convince a majority of
the justices in Vera to definitively rule on the issue of the § 2 defense's general availability.138 As such, whether a state may ever
successfully raise a § 2 defense against an equal protection claim

132 766 SE2d 238 (NC 2014), vacd and remd, 2015 WL 223554 (US) (remanding the
case to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for reconsideration in light of Alabama Legislative Black Caucus).
133 Dickson, 766 SE2d at 248.
134

Id.

See id ("Because the Supreme Court of the United States and the United States
Congress have indicated without ambiguity that they expect States to comply with the
Voting Rights Act, state laws passed for the purpose of complying with the Act must be
capable of surviving strict scrutiny.").
136 Id.
137 Dickson, 766 SE2d at 249-52.
138 It may be that the Court has left the question of § 2 defense's viability undecided
out of a desire to avoid the constitutional issues implicated by the defense. See Vera, 517
US at 990-92 (O'Connor concurring) (discussing the tension between the obligations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act, and defending the
Court's assumption that compliance with § 2 can constitute a compelling interest on the
grounds that "[s]tatutes are presumed constitutional"). For another case in which the
Court similarly sought to avoid a decision on an underlying constitutional issue, see Herrera v Collins, 506 US 390, 416-17 (1993) (assuming without deciding that "actual innocence" demonstrated post-trial may warrant habeas relief, and thus avoiding a precedential decision on the underlying constitutionality of executing a criminal defendant who
has proven such innocence).
135
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remains an open question yet to be resolved by the federal
courts.
B.

Section 2 as a Defense against State Constitutional Claims

While the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of
whether states may use § 2 of the Voting Rights Act as a defense
against racial-districting claims, it recently addressed a related
question concerning § 2's application as a defense to nonracial
state election-law claims. The case in which that question arose,
Bartlett v Strickland, began as a suit in North Carolina state
court against various state officials. 139 The North Carolina General Assembly had drawn the lines of its District 18 in a manner
that split Pender County, North Carolina, into two separate
state legislative districts.140 The plaintiffs alleged that this district plan violated the North Carolina Constitution's Whole
County Provision, which prohibits the General Assembly "from
dividing counties when drawing legislative districts for the State
House and Senate."'1'
The state defendants countered that the General Assembly
had necessarily split Pender County across two districts to comply with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.142 More specifically, the defendants claimed that District 18 had been drawn to ensure that
it contained a black voting-age population of 39.36 percent-a
percentage high enough "to give African-American voters the potential to join with majority voters to elect the minority group's
candidate of its choice"143 and thus to create a "crossover district."'144 A crossover district (also sometimes termed a "coalitional district145) is a district in which minority voters compose
less than 50 percent of the population but are still large enough
in number to elect the candidate of their choice with the help of

Strickland, 556 US at 8 (Kennedy) (plurality).
Id at 7-8 (Kennedy) (plurality).
141 Id (Kennedy) (plurality), citing NC Const Art II, §§ 3, 5.
142 Strickland, 556 US at 8 (Kennedy) (plurality).
143 Id (Kennedy) (plurality).
144 Id at 14 (Kennedy) (plurality).
145 See, for example, Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with It139
140

self? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 NC L Rev 1517, 1539 (2002) (using the term "coalitional districts" to refer to districts in which "the black registered vote
population is less than 50% (typically 33%-39%) and the rest of the registered voters are
non-Hispanic whites"). Throughout this Comment, the terms "crossover district" and
"coalitional district" are used interchangeably.
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"'crossover" votes from majority voters supporting the same
candidate.146

Had the General Assembly instead left Pender County
whole, District 18 would have had a black voting-age population
of only 35.33 percent rather than 39.36 percent-and only the
latter percentage was high enough to create a crossover district. 147 The dispute in Strickland therefore turned on whether

§ 2 required state officials to strengthen the influence of minorities' votes through the creation of crossover districts.148 If and
only if it did, then the state defendants could persuasively wield
§ 2 as a defense by asserting that § 2 superseded the Whole
County Provision in the North Carolina Constitution by virtue of
the US Constitution's Supremacy Clause.149
No opinion commanded a majority in Strickland, but five
justices agreed that § 2 does not require state legislatures to
create crossover districts.150 The North Carolina state officials'
§ 2 defense thus necessarily failed, because it relied on the theory that § 2 indeed required the creation of crossover districts.151
Key to the Court's rejection of this theory-at least as explained
in Justice Anthony Kennedy's plurality opinion-was the fact
that African Americans composed less than 50 percent of the
voting-age population in District 18, both as it was actually
drawn and as it counterfactually could have been drawn to include the entirety of Pender County.152 In other words, the Court
found that no matter how the General Assembly had drawn its
district plan, it would have been impossible for state officials to
draw any electoral district covering Pender County that resulted
in a black voting-age population of over 50 percent. As such, no
conceivable plan could have allowed a hypothetical § 2 plaintiff
to show that the black voting-age population was sufficiently
large to constitute a majority of a single-member district in the
Pender County area-a showing that such a plaintiff would be
required to establish in order to make out a prima facie case of
See Strickland, 556 US at 13 (Kennedy) (plurality).
Id at 14 (Kennedy) (plurality).
148 Id at 6 (Kennedy) (plurality).
149 See id at 7 (Kennedy) (plurality). See also US Const Art VI, cl 2 ("[T]he Laws of
the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.").
150 Strickland, 556 US at 14 (Kennedy) (plurality); id at 26 (Thomas concurring).
151 See id at 14 (Kennedy) (plurality).
152 See id (Kennedy) (plurality).
146
147
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vote dilution under Gingles.153 In turn, no plaintiff could have
succeeded in challenging any district covering the Pender
County area under § 2, regardless of how the General Assembly
had decided to draw its district plan. The state defendants
therefore could not credibly contend that the area in Pender
County would have been susceptible to a § 2 challenge but for
the enactment of the plan at issue.15 The Court accordingly rejected the state's argument that the plan was necessary to ensure state compliance with § 2.155
Although the Strickland Court did not address whether
states may use § 2 as a defense against federal racial-districting
claims, the plurality's reasoning has implications for the application of the § 2 defense against racial gerrymandering and vote
dilution challenges. In particular, because § 2 does not require
states to create crossover districts, it follows that the § 2 defense
cannot succeed if a plaintiff challenges a district whose demographics could have given rise to a crossover district but not
to a majority-minority district. This is because, after Strickland,
electoral districts are immune from § 2 liability if they are located in geographic areas where it is demographically impossible
for racial minorities to compose 50 percent or more of the votingage population of any single-member district.156 As a result,
states will never face § 2 liability for districts in these areas. Accordingly, they can never credibly defend race-conscious districting in such areas on the grounds that such districting was necessary to avoid § 2 liability.
Significantly, however, Strickland leaves room for states to
use § 2 as a basis for creating crossover districts as alternatives
to majority-minority districts in geographic areas whose demographics give rise to § 2 violations under the standards set
forth in Gingles. This is because Strickland imposes a 50 percent
threshold requirement only on the prima facie elements of a § 2
violation, not on the adequacy of a state's remedy for such a violation. 157 Of course, the extent to which states may safely remedy
§ 2 violations by creating crossover districts post-Strickland
must be qualified by the fact that only three justices signed on to
See Gingles, 478 US at 50-51.
See Strickland, 556 US at 14 (Kennedy) (plurality).
155 Id at 24-25 (Kennedy) (plurality).
156 See id at 24 (Kennedy) (plurality).
157 Id at 19-20 (Kennedy) (plurality) ("[A] party asserting § 2 liability must show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the minority population in the potential election
district is greater than 50 percent.") (emphasis added).
153
154
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the plurality opinion in that case. Further casting doubt over
crossover districts' efficacy is the warning of Strickland's principal dissent that the Court's decision interpreted § 2 in a
manner that functionally requires states to create majorityminority districts, 158 despite the plurality's protestations that it
intended no such thing.159 It is against this backdrop that any
comprehensive analysis of the § 2 defense's potential viability
must be considered.

III. IMPLEMENTING THE § 2 DEFENSE
As discussed in the previous Part, several states have attempted to defend against racial gerrymandering claims by arguing that state officials drew the districts at issue to remedy or
avoid a violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.160 When a state
raises this defense, it must demonstrate its counterfactual violation of § 2 by satisfying the Gingles preconditions and the
totality-of-the-circumstances test-the same doctrinal tools
that plaintiffs must use to establish a prima facie case of § 2
vote dilution.11 However, though some lower courts have recognized the availability of the § 2 defense,162 the Supreme Court
has repeatedly acknowledged but expressly declined to address
the question of the defense's legal viability.163 As a result, state
officials have been left to speculate about the answers to a number of legal questions that bear on how states should design district plans: To what extent does § 2 require or allow states to
take race into account when drawing districts? If those districts
are challenged as either constituting racial gerrymanders or resulting in vote dilution, when will states' attempts to comply
with § 2 create a valid affirmative defense for race-conscious districting? And how will courts engage in a legal analysis of such a
defense's merits?

Strickland, 556 US at 27 (Souter dissenting).
See, for example, id at 23 (Kennedy) (plurality) ("[Section] 2 allows States to
choose their own method of complying with the Voting Rights Act, and we have said that
may include drawing crossover districts. . . . Our holding [ ] should not be interpreted to
entrench majority-minority districts by statutory command.").
160 See Shaw II, 517 US at 914; Vera, 517 US at 976 (O'Connor) (plurality); Dickson,
766 SE2d at 248.
161 See Gingles, 478 US at 50-51; Quilter,507 US at 157.
162 See, for example, Dickson, 766 SE2d at 252.
163 See Shaw II, 517 US at 915; Vera, 517 US at 977 (O'Connor) (plurality). See also
158

159

Johnson, 515 US at 921.
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This Part explores and attempts to resolve these questions.
Part III.A offers doctrinal support for the § 2 defense's availability against federal claims of unlawful racial districting. Part
III.B then describes some key aspects of the § 2 defense's application in practice, drawing on analogies to the Supreme Court's
affirmative action cases to situate this analysis within the
Court's broader jurisprudence. In light of the ways in which the
defense would apply in practice, Part III.C recommends that
states make effective use of racial coalitional districts to minimize their risk of liability for unlawful racial districting. Finally,
Part III.D concludes by discussing some normative implications
of interpreting § 2 in a way that permits limited considerations
of race in the redistricting process.
A.

Establishing a Basis for the § 2 Defense

As Justice Antonin Scalia has pointed out, the recognition of
defenses based on the Voting Rights Act may be normatively
wise.164 If courts fail to recognize § 2 as a defense for raceconscious remedial districting, then states in violation of § 2 will
inevitably find themselves in an "impossible position,"165 forced
to choose among three undesirable options: leave a violative district plan as is and risk liability under § 2, fix the plan using
race-conscious principles but risk violating the Equal Protection
Clause, or attempt to fix the plan using a race-neutral approach
but risk either failing to remedy the existing violation or creating a new one. 166 The availability of a § 2 defense solves this
quandary by providing states with an escape hatch to correct
noncompliant districts without simultaneously creating fresh
risks of litigation. 167
In addition to this normative support for the § 2 defense's
availability, doctrinal frameworks already exist to support the
§ 2 defense and to legally justify race-conscious districting.
This Section discusses those doctrinal frameworks, first in the

164 See LULAC, 548 US at 518 (Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
165 Id (Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
166 A strictly race-neutral approach to remedial districting can leave a state exposed
to liability because, under the Gingles results test, § 2 liability may attach even if state
officials do not actively intend to take race into account when drawing district lines. See
text accompanying notes 33-36.
167 See Dickson, 766 SE2d at 248 (advancing the policy argument that the § 2 defense's availability has the potential to reduce states' litigation costs).
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context of equal protection racial gerrymandering claims and
then in the context of § 2 vote dilution claims.
1. The compelling-interest prong of strict scrutiny review.
To the extent that its past cases have considered how the
§ 2 defense could fit into existing doctrinal frameworks, the Supreme Court has indicated that whether states may ever use § 2
as a defense-at least against equal protection claims of racial
gerrymandering-turns on whether compliance with § 2 constitutes a "compelling interest" for the purposes of strict scrutiny
review.168
The fact that § 2 is essentially a codification of the Fifteenth
Amendment69 suggests that compliance with § 2 can in fact
qualify as a compelling state interest in some circumstances.
The Supreme Court has observed that § 2's purpose is to enforce
170
the right to vote as guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment.
Furthermore, the similarity between the texts of § 2 and the Fifteenth Amendment suggests the interchangeable nature of the
rights they protect: § 2 prohibits "any State or political subdivision" from imposing voting practices that "result[ ] in a denial or
abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color,"171 and the Fifteenth Amendment likewise provides that "[t]he right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race [or] color."17, As such,
to the extent that § 2 operationalizes the principles established
by the Fifteenth Amendment, § 2 can be understood as a codification of constitutional rights.
Outside the voting-rights context, the Supreme Court has
stated that, for the purposes of strict scrutiny review, government officials may justify race-conscious action if that action is

168 See, for example, Shaw II, 517 US at 915 (assuming for the sake of argument
that § 2 may be used as a defense and situating the analysis of this defense within the
strict scrutiny framework); Vera, 517 US at 977 (O'Connor) (plurality) (same).
169 See notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
170 See National Associationfor the Advancement of Colored People v New York, 413
US 345, 350 (1973) ("Section 2 ...clearly indicates that the purpose of the Act is to assist in the effectuation of the Fifteenth Amendment."). See also South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 308 (1966), overruled on other grounds by Shelby County, Alabama
v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013) (characterizing the Voting Rights Act as "effectuat[ing]
...the [Fifteenth Amendment's] prohibition against racial discrimination in voting").
171 52 USC § 10301(a).
172 US Const Amend XV, § 1.
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undertaken to avert what would otherwise constitute "a prima
facie case of a... statutory violation."' 173 The Court has further
suggested that this justification for race-conscious action is
especially robust when the statutory right is closely tied to a
constitutional one. For example, the Court has found that raceconscious state action may be lawful if undertaken to avoid disparate impact liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,174 which statutorily extends the Fourteenth Amendment's
limitations on race discrimination in employment from the state
to the private sector. 7 5 By analogy to these strict scrutiny precedents, compliance with § 2 may likewise constitute a compelling
state interest for the purposes of strict scrutiny review of an alleged racial gerrymander-particularly in light of the close relationship between § 2 and the Fifteenth Amendment.176
Some scholars have suggested that, to the extent that compliance with § 2 constitutes a compelling government interest
requiring race-conscious districting, the modern Supreme Court
may be poised to strike it down as irredeemably at odds with the
Equal Protection Clause and therefore unconstitutional. 177 Yet
several signals from the modern Court indicate that a majority
of the justices would not necessarily be so inclined. First, a reading of § 2 that places a wholesale prohibition on race-conscious
remedial districting would run counter to precedents in which

of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co, 488 US 469, 493-500 (1989).
Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253, codified at 42 USC § 2000e et seq.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701(b), 703(a), Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat at 253-55,

173 City
174
175

codified at 42 USC §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(a); Ricci v DeStefano, 557 US 557, 580-84
(2009). A testament to this relationship between Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment is that employment discrimination plaintiffs often bring claims against public employers under both laws concurrently. See, for example, id at 563; Local Number 93, In.ternationalAssociation of Firefighters,AFL-CIO C.L.C. v City of Cleveland, 478 US 501,
504-05 (1986) (describing a complaint filed by minority firefighters claiming that the
City of Cleveland had violated both Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment).
176 This conclusion finds support from at least two of the justices who were seated
on the Court when Shaw II and Vera were decided. See Vieth v Jubelirer, 541 US 267,
351 (2004) (Souter dissenting) (speculating that a state defendant in an equal protection
partisan gerrymandering case could argue that a given district plan was justified under
§ 2 by "the need to avoid racial vote dilution"); Vera, 517 US at 990-92 (O'Connor concurring) (using the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act to argue that compliance
with § 2 could be a compelling state interest).
177 See, for example, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act in the Hands of a Conservative Court, 5 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol 125, 14243 (2010). The suggestion that the Court may be prepared to strike down § 2 has also
been made in the popular press. See, for example, Jeffrey Rosen, Eric Holder's Suit
against Texas Gives the Supreme Court a Chance to Gut Even More of the Voting Rights
Act (The New Republic, Sept 1, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/H8K5-JMVV.
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the Court has elsewhere tolerated limited state reliance on
racial classifications, such as in the Title VII context and in
cases involving affirmative action in university- admissions
78
programs.1
Second, and perhaps more importantly, four of the currently
seated justices agreed in LULAC that compliance with § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act could be a compelling state interest, despite
its potential tension with the Equal Protection Clause. 179 Significantly, the justices who endorsed this view were Chief Justice
John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas,
and Samuel Alito-a somewhat surprising assortment, given
some scholars' views that these justices are the most politically
conservative members of today's Court and would be more inclined than the other justices to strike down § 2 as unconstitutional.180 These four justices reasoned that "[ijf compliance with
§ 5 were not a compelling state interest, then a State could be
placed in the impossible position of having to choose between
compliance with § 5 and compliance with the Equal Protection
Clause."lsl Insofar as this logic extends to the § 2 context,
LULAC suggests that this same group of justices would be willing to join their colleagues in upholding an interpretation of § 2
that leaves room for race-conscious state action, contrary to
speculations in the academic literature.
2. The totality-of-the-circumstances test in vote dilution
analysis.
As discussed in the previous Section, an analogy to the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny cases outside the § 2 context indicates that a doctrinal basis exists for states' use of the § 2 defense against racial gerrymandering claims. This analogy,
178 See, for example, Ricci, 557 US at 580-84; Fisher v University of Texas at Austin,
133 S Ct 2411, 2419 (2013) (holding not that race-conscious admissions processes are per
se violations of the Equal Protection Clause but rather that courts must apply strict
scrutiny in evaluating the constitutionality of affirmative action measures in university
admissions).
179 LULAC, 548 US at 518 (Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), citing Shaw II, 517 US at 909, and J.A. Croson, 488 US at 498-506 (concluding that "compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act can be [a compelling state]
interest" on the grounds that "race may be used where necessary to remedy identified
past discrimination").
180 See, for example, Fuentes-Rohwer, 5 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol at 142-43 (cited
in note 177).
181 LULAC, 548 US at 518 (Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
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however, speaks only to the viability of the defense as a shield
against equal protection challenges. It does not bear directly on
the defense's viability as a shield against claims of § 2 vote dilution, because a prima facie showing of vote dilution under § 2unlike a prima facie showing of an equal protection violationdoes not trigger strict scrutiny analysis.182
Nevertheless, a doctrinal basis for the § 2 defense exists in
the vote dilution context as well: a court could situate a § 2 defense raised against a § 2 vote dilution claim within the broad,
fact-intensive totality-of-the-circumstances test that follows a
plaintiffs showing of the three Gingles preconditions.183 Remedial race-conscious districting reasonably falls among the considerations pertaining to the "history of voting-related discrimination" in a given geographic region, which the Senate Judiciary
Committee expressly enumerated as a factor relevant to the
totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry.184 And even without this
clue from legislative history, the totality-of-the-circumstances
test--one of the most capacious legal standards in the judicial
compendium-is sufficiently wide reaching to account for the extent to which a state's districting choices are motivated by a
need to comply with § 2.
On this account, courts would not need to invent a wholly
new doctrinal framework to recognize the viability of the § 2 defense in the context of vote dilution cases. In fact, in both racial
gerrymandering and vote dilution cases, courts could economize
on existing doctrinal structures by adapting the § 2 defense to
strict scrutiny analysis or to the totality-of-the-circumstances
inquiry, respectively. The ready availability of these doctrinal
frameworks thus offers a sound legal basis for judicial recognition of the § 2 defense.
B.

Applying the § 2 Defense

After identifying the doctrinal forms that the § 2 defense
may take, there remain questions as to how courts might actually
evaluate the merits of the § 2 defense and under what circumstances the § 2 defense should prevail. As with the previous Section's discussion of the doctrinal basis for the § 2 defense, a discussion of these questions can be bifurcated into separate

182 See Part I.B.2.
183 See, for example, Quilter, 507 US at 157; De Grandy, 512 US at 1012.
184 Gingles, 478 US at 44-45, citing S Rep 97-417 at 28-29 (cited in note 27).
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analyses: one that examines the defense's application against
claims of racial gerrymandering brought under the Equal Protection Clause, and one that examines the defense's application
against claims of vote dilution premised on § 2 itself.
1. The § 2 defense vis-A-vis the Equal Protection Clause.
To use § 2 as a defense against a racial gerrymandering
claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause, a state must
show that (1) it had a compelling interest in avoiding a § 2 violation and (2) the challenged district was narrowly tailored to further that interest.185 This doctrinal scheme follows from the Supreme Court's apparent assumption that if § 2 offers a defense
to racial gerrymandering claims, then the merits of that defense
are properly analyzed within the framework traditionally used
for strict scrutiny review of state practices classifying citizens on
the basis of race. 8 6 To pass muster with respect to the first component of strict scrutiny review, a state raising the § 2 defense
must therefore show, using the three Gingles preconditions
and the totality-of-the-circumstances test, that the district
plan in place prior to the new, allegedly unconstitutional plan
would have violated § 2.1 Absent this counterfactual § 2 violation, a state cannot credibly claim to have acted out of an interest in avoiding such a violation. Likewise, to satisfy the
second, narrow-tailoring prong of strict scrutiny review, a state
must demonstrate that alternative redistricting plans would
have been insufficient to avoid a § 2 violation.18
Whether a § 2 violation would have occurred but for the particular design of a challenged district plan is a question of law
that courts should decide with no deference to a state legislature's ex ante assessment of its risk of § 2 liability. From a
pragmatic standpoint, such a nondeferential approach to the § 2
defense may help courts identify district plans that are crafted
not out of good-faith attempts to comply with § 2 but instead out
of an intent to racially discriminate or otherwise unjustifiably

185 See text accompanying notes 168-76.
186 See Johnson, 515 US at 915; Shaw 1, 509 US at 643; Hunt v Cromartie, 526 US
541, 546 (1999).
187 See Shaw II, 517 US at 914-18. See also text accompanying notes 122-23.
188 See Shaw II, 517 US at 917-18 (impliedly rejecting the proposition that a raceconscious remedial district plan can be "narrowly tailored" to correct a § 2 violation when
an alternative plan would have more effectively "address[ed] the [state's] professed interest of relieving [ ] vote dilution").
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rely on racial classifications. A nondeferential approach to evaluating the § 2 defense thus strikes a workable compromise for
judicial review of state redistricting: it recognizes states' need to
have the defense available but simultaneously cabins states'
ability to use the defense as an excuse for an unduly expansive
reliance on race.
The legal underpinnings for a nondeferential approach to
evaluating the Gingles preconditions and the totality-of-thecircumstances test find support in the approach that the Supreme Court has taken in affirmative action cases involving
university admissions. An analogy to this chapter of the Court's
affirmative action jurisprudence is apposite for several reasons. 8 9 First, § 2 compliance and university affirmative action
measures share common means and goals: both types of government action involve race-conscious decisionmaking on the
part of state actors for the purpose of decreasing the degree of
racial polarization within a community. Second, affirmative action cases, like racial gerrymandering cases, often involve claims
that are premised on the Equal Protection Clause and that trigger strict scrutiny review. Thus, they compare instructively to
the voting-rights context. For example, two of the Court's modern affirmative action cases-Fisher v University of Texas at
Austin9o and Grutter v Bollinger91-were equal protection cases
brought by white plaintiffs who sought to dismantle affirmative
action admission policies at higher education institutions.192
193
Both cases also reached the stage of strict scrutiny analysis.
Given these shared characteristics, the Court's affirmative action cases shed light on which government interests may be
deemed sufficiently compelling to justify race-conscious state
policies, including race-conscious legislative districting.194
189 Notably, one of the judges in Dickson drew on precisely this analogy. See Dickson, 766 SE2d at 265 (Beasley concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing Fisher,
133 S Ct at 2419-20 (drawing on affirmative action cases involving university admissions to suggest a framework for strict scrutiny review of district plans designed on the
basis of racial considerations). For an example of this analogy as made in the academic
literature, see Fuentes-Rohwer, 5 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol at 152 (cited in note 177)
(briefly comparing states' attempts at § 2 compliance with race-based affirmative action).
190 133 S Ct 2411 (2013).
191 539 US 306 (2003).
192 Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2415; Grutter, 539 US at 316-17.
193 Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2419-22; Grutter, 539 US at 326-27.
194 For another modern Supreme Court case addressing the constitutionality of racebased affirmative action in university admissions, see generally Gratz v Bollinger, 539
US 244 (2003). Note that the Court's discussion in Gratz, unlike in Fisher and Grutter,
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Support for a nondeferential approach to the § 2 defense can
be parsed from a careful reading of these affirmative action cases, even though Fisher and Grutter send mixed signals about
how much deference is due when state officials assert that a
race-conscious action was narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest. On the one hand, in Fisher the Court stated in no
uncertain terms that a state university "receives no deference"
on the question whether a race-based affirmative action program has been narrowly tailored to the university's stated "goal
of diversity."195 On the other hand, the Court in Grutter held
that a public law school should be accorded some "degree of
deference" on the threshold question whether a goal of diversity can constitute a compelling state interest at all.196 Accordingly, a principled reading of Fisher and Grutter suggests that the
amount of deference owed to state actors varies between the
two prongs of strict scrutiny analysis, with no deference given
on the narrow-tailoring prong but some deference given on the
compelling-interest prong. 97 If this interpretation were directly
applied to the § 2 context, then courts would give state defendants no deference on the question whether the state's remedial
plan was narrowly tailored to cure a § 2 violation, but courts
would afford some deference on the question whether the state
would have been in violation of § 2 but for the remedial plan.
There are several reasons, however, why a court assessing
the merits of a § 2 defense in racial gerrymandering cases
should reject such an approach and instead apply a nondeferential standard to both prongs of the strict scrutiny analysis. As an
initial matter, whether a state is in violation of § 2 is inherently
a question of law requiring the application of legal doctrine to
resolve, unlike the question whether a given university can offer its students a better education by promoting diversity on
neither delves deeply into the compelling-interest prong of strict scrutiny review nor
speaks to the amount of deference that courts should give to state actors when engaging
in such review. Id at 268-75.
195 Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2419-20.
196 Grutter,539 US at 328. See also id ('CThe Law School's educational judgment that
such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.").
197 For other scholars' and practitioners' accounts of the tiered system of deference
emerging from these cases, see, for example, Yifan (Yvonne) C. Everett and Sarah
Hampton Cheatham, Affirmative Action in Education, 15 Georgetown J Gender & L 219,
232-36 (2014); Scott Warner, Pete Land, and Kendra Berner, The U.S. Supreme Court's
Decision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin: What It Tells Us (and Doesn't Tell
Us) about the Consideration of Race in College and University Admissions and Other
Contexts, 60 Fed Law 48, 50-51, 54-55 (2013).
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campus. 198 Grutter can therefore be distinguished as inapplicable
to the § 2 context because it involved an asserted compelling interest-the goal of increased diversity-that fundamentally differs from the compelling interest that a state must assert when
raising the § 2 defense. Put differently, the logic supporting
Grutter's semideferential approach relates to the fact that universities are better positioned institutionally than courts are to
evaluate student life on campus and to ascertain whether increased diversity would contribute positively to education.199 The
opposite is true in the racial-districting context: given a set of
relevant demographic facts, courts occupy an institutional role
and possess legal authority that state actors do not share to adjudicate whether a challenged district plan unlawfully dilutes
votes as a threshold question of law under Gingles-a doctrinal
determination that is pivotal to the § 2 defense's availability in
any given case. 200 Thus, a primary justification for the use of
deference in affirmative action cases like Grutter is wholly absent from the § 2 context.
Moreover, the Court in Fisherlater expressed some ambivalence about the Grutter Court's semideferential approach. After

discussing the deference that Grutter accorded to universities on
the compelling-interest prong of strict scrutiny analysis, the
Fisher Court noted the disagreement among the justices on this
198 For a point of comparison, see Johnson, 515 US at 922-23, citing United States v
Nixon, 418 US 683, 704 (1974), Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803),
Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 211 (1962), and Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1, 18 (1958) (applying
separation of powers principles to conclude that it is the province of the courts-to the
exclusion of other government actors-to decide as a matter of law whether a state is in
violation of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act for the purpose of assessing the merits of a
§ 5 defense). For a more complete discussion of Johnson, see text accompanying notes
95-105.
199 See Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2419, citing Grutter, 539 US at 328, 330 ("[A] university's
educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to
which we defer. . . . [T]he decision to pursue the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity.., is, in substantial measure, an academic judgment to which some,
but not complete, judicial deference is proper.") (quotation marks omitted).
200 See Johnson, 515 US at 922-23. Notably, current events offer examples of local
officials involved in redistricting disputes who have expressly acknowledged this disparity in institutional competencies and have accordingly declined to make definitive statements on the merits of potential § 2 vote dilution claims (or their state law equivalents).
See, for example, Erin Gurewitz, Santa BarbaraExploring Voting Changes (The Daily
Nexus, Mar 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ES2U-YYER (discussing a recent settlement in a vote dilution case arising over an alleged violation of the California Voting
Rights Act in Santa Barbara, California, and reporting a Santa Barbara city attorney's
statement that "a definitive conclusion on whether or not there was vote dilution [in the
challenged districts] can only be reached after trial").
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issue.201 Further, while it did not overrule this vestige of Grutter,

a majority of the justices in Fisher strongly implied that they
would have been willing to do so had the parties requested such
an overruling.22 The justices' apparent lack of commitment to
this aspect of Grutter thus suggests that limiting Grutter to its
facts, instead of transferring its deferential standard to the § 2
context, would be reasonably consistent with recent trends in
the Court's racial-equal protection jurisprudence.
To illustrate the practical consequences that this nondeferential approach would have, consider the approach taken by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in Dickson.23 In that case, the
court found merit in the state officials' § 2 defense on the
grounds that "the General Assembly identified past or present
discrimination with sufficient specificity to justify the creation of
[Voting Rights Act] districts in order to avoid section 2 liability"
and that "the General Assembly, before making its redistricting
decisions, had a strong basis in evidence on which to reach a
'
conclusion that race-based remedial action was necessary. "204
The court, however, never engaged in its own analysis of the evidentiary record to determine whether the state defendants had
in fact been in violation of § 2. Instead, the court merely listed
the reports, law review articles, and academic studies that the
defendants had offered the trial court in support of their § 2 defense.25 "[A]ffording near-absolute deference to the General
Assembly,"206 the court then summarily concluded that this
201 Fisher,133 S Ct at 2419. The fractured opinion in Grutter itself evinces this longstanding disagreement: Thomas's separate opinion in that case directly contradicts the
majority and maintains that universities should be given no deference on the compellinginterest prong of strict scrutiny analysis. Grutter, 539 US at 362-64 (Thomas concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
202 Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2419 ("There is disagreement about whether Grutter was consistent with the principles of equal protection in approving this compelling interest in
diversity. But the parties here do not ask the Court to revisit that aspect of Grutter's
holding.") (citations omitted).
203 For a discussion of Dickson, see text accompanying notes 132-37.
204 Dickson, 766 SE2d at 252.
205 Id at 250-52.
206 Brief of Election Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Dickson
v Rucho, Docket No 14-839, *2 (US filed Feb 17, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 2015 WL
678181) ("Professors' Amicus Brief'). This amicus brief was filed in support of a petition
for a writ of certiorari filed by the plaintiffs in Dickson. See generally Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Dickson v Rucho, No 14-839 (US filed Jan 16, 2015). As detailed in note 132,
the United States Supreme Court granted the petition but then remanded the case in
April 2015 to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for reconsideration in light of Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v Alabama, 2015 WL 1310746 (US). Dickson v Rucho,
2015 WL 223554 (US).
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documentary corpus sufficed to meet its strong-basis-in-evidence
standard.207
Thus, while the Dickson court correctly recognized the
availability of the § 2 defense, a careful reading of the United
States Supreme Court's strict scrutiny jurisprudence indicates
that the Dickson court adopted an erroneous approach to analyzing the defense's merits by according undue deference to state
actors. If the court had instead applied the correct, nondeferential approach to its analysis of the § 2 defense, it would have reviewed the record before it more rigorously and engaged with
the Gingles preconditions to determine for itself whether the
state would have been in violation of § 2 but for the district plan
at issue. This type of searching, nondeferential approach would
help to more effectively screen out race-based district plans that
cannot be justified by concrete § 2 concerns-precisely the types
of district plans that have most concerned commentators critical
of the Dickson decision.28
The doctrinal mechanics of this nondeferential approach,
however, are intrinsically framed within strict scrutiny analysis
and thus apply to the merits of the § 2 defense only when raised
against equal protection claims of racial gerrymandering. In
contrast, the next Section considers the defense's application
when raised against § 2 vote dilution claims.
2. The § 2 defense vis-A-vis § 2 itself.
Separate from an analysis of the § 2 defense's application
against racial gerrymandering claims is the question of the defense's ability to succeed against vote dilution claims brought
under § 2 itself-a question that no litigant has yet raised in
court. This potential application of the § 2 defense is worthy of
consideration because the defense could theoretically arise
whenever one minority group claims that its members' votes are
diluted by a district plan that was designed to protect the voting
power of a second minority group.
Outside the courtroom, minority voters in some neighborhoods
have indeed raised such claims. Consider, for example, Illinois's
current Congressional District 4, a majority-minority district

207
208

Dickson, 766 SE2d at 252.
See Professors' Amicus Brief at *13-14 (cited in note 206).
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designed to avoid the dilution of Latino votes under § 2.209 A map
of District 4 and its surrounding districts are depicted below in
Figure 3.210 District 4, appearing in the center of the map, wraps
almost entirely around District 7 and has an "odd shape" that
"resemble[s] a set of earmuffs."211
FIGURE 4. 2011 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS NEAR CHICAGO,
ILLINOIS

District 4 fragments Chicago's Chinatown neighborhood,
and some organizations have consequently objected to the district on the grounds that it dilutes Asian American votes in violation of § 2.212 If voters were to challenge District 4 on this
ground, the state of Illinois could conceivably attempt to use § 2
to defend that the design of District 4 was necessary to avoid the
dilution of Latino votes. In such a case, a court would be faced
209 See Committee for a Fair and Balanced Map v Illinois State Board of Elections,
835 F Supp 2d 563, 591-92 (ND Ill 2011) (three-judge panel) (reporting that the Illinois
General Assembly decided to maintain District 4 as a majority-minority Latino district
after receiving expert advice that such a district would be necessary for the state "to protect itself from suit" under § 2).
210 For an original copy of the map shown in Figure 3, see id at 596.
211 John Kanaly, Gutierrez's Earmuff-Shaped District Creates Uncompetitive Race
(Medill Reports, Oct 18, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/C6BL-FN8A.
212 See Aricka Flowers, Minority Groups: Illinois Redistricting Maps "Unfair" (Progress Illinois, May 31, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/7YYW-QRQX.
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with the yet-unanswered question whether § 2 may be raised as
a defense to § 2 vote dilution claims.
Given the doctrinal basis for raising the § 2 defense against
§ 2 claims, 213 the defense would affect a vote dilution case's outcome only if the case involved demographics that allowed both
the plaintiff and the state to establish the three Gingles preconditions with regard to both the challenged and counterfactual
district plans, respectively.214 However, in that same subset of
cases, each party's establishment of the Gingles preconditions
would create a doctrinal stalemate such that a court's analysis
of the § 2 defense's merits would necessarily devolve into an unstructured evaluation of § 2's totality-of-the-circumstances test.
In other words, a court's ultimate determination of which minority group would be entitled to command a citizen voting-age majority in a contested district would turn solely on historical, sociological, and political information bearing on which of the two
groups had been more negatively affected by racial discrimination
overall
under
the
fact-intensive
totality-of-thecircumstances inquiry.215
This application of the § 2 defense engenders two complications, each lending itself to divergent implications for the § 2 defense's viability against § 2 vote dilution claims. The first complication is administrative: In the case of a conflict between two
groups that have both historically been considered minorities in
the United States, it may be far from clear-both for states hoping to avoid legal disputes and for the courts charged with resolving them-which conclusions a court should draw from § 2's
totality-of-the-circumstances test. For example, consider the
facts of De Grandy.216 In that case, black and Hispanic voters
both alleged that a Florida district plan had diluted their votes
in violation of § 2.217 Although the lower court in De Grandy
found that both sets of plaintiffs had independently established prima facie cases of § 2 liability, it nevertheless upheld

213 See text accompanying notes 183-84.
214 See text accompanying note 187.
215 See notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing the factors that bear on the

totality-of-the-circumstances test under § 2). Note that this doctrinal equipoise does not
occur when § 2 is raised as a defense against an equal protection racial gerrymandering
claim, because such a case inherently lacks the doctrinal symmetries that would characterize a case in which the § 2 defense were raised against a § 2 vote dilution claim.
216 For a more complete discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in De Grandy,
see text accompanying notes 49-55.
217 De Grandy, 512 US at 1000-02.
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the district plan at issue, deferring to the state's enactment of
the plan on the grounds that it was impossible to fashion a rem218 If
edy accommodating the interests of both minority groups.
confronted with competing vote dilution claims in a case in
which a meritorious § 2 defense were raised against a § 2 claim,
a court leaning in the direction of the De Grandy district court's
approach might find in favor of the state defendants, deferring
to the status quo given the lack of a superior alternative.
The second complication is jurisprudential: In LULAC, the
Supreme Court indicated that § 2 should not be interpreted to
allow a state to remedy the dilution of one minority group's
votes at the expense of another's219-an interpretation that
would necessarily be implicit in judicial recognition of the ultimate merits of a § 2 defense. Given this concern, for the subset
of vote dilution cases in which the § 2 defense's availability
would potentially be outcome determinative, a court might be
unwilling to entertain the § 2 defense at all-even if the same
court were willing to recognize the defense when raised in response to equal protection racial gerrymandering claims.
A thought experiment on a court's potential resolution of the
vote dilution issues implicated by Illinois's Congressional District 4 illustrates the tension between these competing administrative and jurisprudential concerns: Imagine that a group of
Asian Americans files a § 2 complaint in federal district court
against Illinois state officials. Imagine further that the officials
defend District 4 by arguing that its creation was necessary to
avoid diluting Latino votes under § 2, and the district court
finds merit in both the § 2 claim and the § 2 defense. How
would the court resolve the case? On the one hand, the court
might follow the approach taken by the district court in De
Grandy, deferring to the status quo and effectively relying on
the merits of Illinois's § 2 defense to uphold District 4. On the
other hand, the court might find grounds for refusing to consider
the § 2 defense's merits altogether, or for otherwise choosing to
strike down District 4. For example, the court might rely on
LULAC as a basis for declining to recognize the § 2 defense
218 Id at 1004 ('The [district court's] findings of vote dilution in the senatorial districts had no practical effect ... because the court held that remedies for the blacks and
the Hispanics were mutually exclusive."). See also De Grandy v Wetherell, 815 F Supp
1550, 1580 (ND Fla 1992), affd in part and revd in part, De Grandy, 512 US 997.
219 LULAC, 548 US at 429, citing Shaw II, 517 US at 917. See also Shaw II, 517 US
at 917 ("The vote dilution injuries suffered by [African American § 2 plaintiffs] are not
remedied by creating a safe majority-black district somewhere else in the State.").
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against a § 2 claim, pointing to this precedent for the proposition
that state actors cannot lawfully "make up for the less-thanequal opportunity of some individuals by providing greater opportunity to others.220 Likewise, even a court otherwise inclined
to follow the De Grandy approach might nevertheless strike
down District 4 if it concluded that Illinois could have instead
designed a plan that accommodated both minority groups
(such as a plan that included one majority-minority district for
Latinos and a separate majority-minority district for Asian
Americans).
As this example illustrates, the Court's vote dilution precedents are mired with contradictory implications for the viability
of the § 2 defense against § 2 claims. At least in this context,
then, the defense's fate remains uncertain. Ultimately, whether
courts would be willing to recognize the § 2 defense as raised
against § 2 vote dilution claims-as well as how courts would
apply the defense in cases in which the totality-of-thecircumstances test failed to yield clear results-is a question
that remains too far on the horizon of future case law to presently be ripe for resolution.
C.

Developing a Districting Strategy in Light of the § 2
Defense

Given the above account of how the § 2 defense might operate in practice, how could a state seeking to avoid a § 2 violation
design its district plan in a way that would avoid liability under
both § 2 and the Equal Protection Clause? Under one reading of
Gingles, a state might attempt to avoid § 2 liability by intentionally creating majority-minority districts.221 If consequently
sued under the Equal Protection Clause for intentionally taking
race into account in remedial districting, the state could then
use § 2 as an affirmative defense, arguing that the plan was
narrowly tailored to further the state's compelling interest in
avoiding a § 2 violation.222

LULAC, 548 US at 429 (citation omitted).
See, for example, Vera, 517 US at 993 (O'Connor concurring) (postulating that
§ 2 "may require a State to create a majority-minority district where the three Gingles
factors are present"); Fuentes-Rohwer, 5 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol at 151 (cited in note
177) (noting that the Voting Rights Act may be "deployed in furtherance of majorityminority districts").
222 See text accompanying notes 185-87.
220
221
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However, if sued under § 2 itself for drawing a plan that resulted in vote dilution, the § 2 defense might be unavailable to
offer the state a safe haven from liability. In particular, the defense's availability will depend on the court's willingness to consider the defense in the context of § 2 vote dilution cases. 223 As
such, the creation of majority-minority districts may not be an
entirely foolproof means of remedying a district plan that violates § 2. Furthermore, some scholars have expressed a concern
that, to the extent that states rely on an interpretation of § 2
that mandates the creation of majority-minority districts, the
current Supreme Court may be poised to strike down § 2 as irredeemably at odds with the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore unconstitutional.224
Instead, states can avoid and remedy § 2 violations by creating coalitional districts in which "minority voters make up less
than a majority of the voting-age population" but are still large
enough in number to "elect the candidate[s] of [their] choice with
help from voters who are members of the majority and who cross
over to support the minority's preferred candidate."225 The critical feature of coalitional districts is that they can protect a state
from liability under § 2 by entirely precluding plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie case of vote dilution. This is because
plaintiffs who challenge coalitional districts as resulting in vote
dilution will be systematically unable to establish the third Gingles precondition, which requires plaintiffs to show that the majority group in a given geographic region votes as a bloc to defeat
the minority group's preferred candidate.26 In other words, although § 2 does not formally require states to draw coalitional
223
224

See text accompanying notes 216-20.
See Fuentes-Rohwer, 5 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol at 142-43 (cited in note 177);

Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 Harv L Rev
1663, 1735-36 (2001).
225 Strickland, 556 US at 13 (Kennedy) (plurality). Of course, from a pragmatic
standpoint, whether it is logistically possible for a state to create coalitional districts
may be limited by the extent to which voting is racially polarized in the relevant geographic area. See Note, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining
Racially Polarized Voting, 116 Harv L Rev 2208, 2224-25 (2003) (explaining that a legislature's ability to create coalitional districts depends on "polarized voting [] declin[ing]
to the point that minority voters have an 'equal opportunity' to elect their preferred candidates in coalitional districts"). Empirical evidence suggests that racially polarized voting is indeed declining and that the creation of coalitional districts is therefore becoming
increasingly possible. See Pildes, 80 NC L Rev at 1529 (cited in note 145) ("[W]hile voting continues to show some degree of racial polarization, the degree of polarization nonetheless permits a meaningful level of white-black coalitional politics.').
226 See Gingles, 478 US at 50-51.
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districts,227 the creation of coalitional districts is an effective
strategy for foreclosing the risk of § 2 liability altogether.
A race-conscious districting strategy focused on the creation
of coalitional districts would stave off the risk of equal protection
liability as well. First, though a state must consider race in the
course of creating a racially integrated coalitional district, it
may be able to block plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie
racial gerrymandering claim by arguing that voters' cross racial
political affiliations-not race itself-predominantly informed a
challenged coalitional district's design.228 Equal protection precedents show that courts are indeed willing to dismiss claims alleging racial gerrymandering if a state defendant can show that
political rather than racial considerations predominated a challenged district's design, even when racial considerations entered
into the design's calculus.229 Second, even if a court were to allow
a plaintiffs prima facie equal protection claim to stand, a state
defendant could still attempt to avoid an adverse judgment by
availing itself of the § 2 defense.230 In this way, the creation of
coalitional districts constitutes a workable reconciliation of the
otherwise-conflicting obligations that § 2 and the Equal Protection Clause impose on state governments.
Moreover, the creation of coalitional districts to avoid § 2 violations is an approach that seven justices strongly endorsed in
Strickland, an otherwise highly fractured decision. Writing for
the plurality, for example, Justice Kennedy stressed that "§ 2 allows States to choose their own method of complying with the
Voting Rights Act, and [the Court has] said that may include
drawing crossover districts." He further advanced that "states
could draw crossover districts as they deemed appropriate" to
remedy § 2 violations.231 Justice David Souter, the author of
Strickland's principal dissent, similarly encouraged the creation
of coalitional districts and praised the ability of such districts to
"vindicate the interest expressly protected by § 2."232 This broad
endorsement of the coalitional-district approach countervails
See Strickland, 556 US at 23-25 (Kennedy) (plurality).
See Johnson, 515 US at 916.
229 See, for example, Easley v Cromartie,532 US 234, 243-44, 257-58 (2001) (rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that racial considerations predominated the design of a North
Carolina district plan, on the grounds that the design was instead predominated by political considerations).
230 See text accompanying notes 185-87.
231 Strickland, 556 US at 23-24 (Kennedy) (plurality).
232 Id at 32 (Souter dissenting).
227
228

1702

The University of Chicago Law Review

[82:1659

concerns that Strickland requires the creation of majorityminority districts to the exclusion of coalitional districts.233
D.

Taking Stock: In Defense of the Defense

Thus far, this Part has undertaken a thorough legal analysis of the availability and potential merits of the § 2 defense.
Namely, it has examined the legal basis for judicial recognition
of the § 2 defense, constructed an analytical framework for evaluating the defense's merits, and envisioned how the defense's
availability might impact state officials' districting choices.
There remains, however, a yet-unexamined baseline question:
As a normative matter, why should the law ever permit state officials to engage in race-conscious districting?
Government action based on racial classifications has rarely
played an admirable role in American history.234 Accordingly, to
the extent that § 2 is in tension with the Equal Protection
Clause's prohibition against "invidious discrimination,"25 one
might contend that it should not be tolerated as the basis of a
judicially cognizable defense against claims of racial districting.
After all, in Roberts's words, "[i]t is a sordid business, this divvy-

ing [ ] up by race."236
However, an interpretation of § 2 that allows room for raceconscious districting is normatively defensible in spite of this objection. As an initial matter, judicial acceptance of the defense
may be the only way to reconcile the Voting Rights Act-widely
hailed as one of the greatest triumphs of the civil rights movement-with the Equal Protection Clause. Importantly, this attempt at reconciliation is motivated by more than just a desire
to offer states a way out of the "impossible position" 237 that they
face when deciding whether and how to comply with § 2. Rather,
the attempt is ultimately also driven by the recognition that
both the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause
have generated positive results for the development of American
race relations over time. The Voting Rights Act is "widely considered one of the most effective instruments of social legislation

233 See text accompanying notes 157-59.
234 See generally, for example, David F. Ericson, Slavery in the American Republic:
Developing the Federal Government, 1791-1861 (Kansas 2011).
235 LULAC, 548 US at 461 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).
236 Id at 511 (Roberts concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
237 Id at 518 (Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

2015]

Sued If You Do, Sued If You Don't

1703

in the modern era of American reform";23s 'likewise, flexible,
adaptive interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause's scope
have been celebrated by scholars as essential to the social pro239
gress that occurred over the course of the twentieth century.
These two sources of law must be made compatible with one
another if they are to continue advancing race relations in the
future.
Moreover, the availability of the § 2 defense, while permitting race-conscious state action to a limited extent, may counterintuitively have the effect of decreasing racial polarization in
electoral districts by incentivizing states to focus on creating coalitional districts in place of majority-minority districts.240 Besides having a practical advantage over majority-minority districts by more effectively protecting states from liability,
coalitional districts are also normatively superior because they
downplay rather than emphasize racial polarization in voter
preferences while reducing the extent to which political campaigns make targeted racial appeals.241
In addition to these effects-based arguments, scholars have
advanced a variety of moral and political arguments in support
of remedial race-conscious government action generally. For example, scholars have defended such remedial action on moral
grounds by arguing that it neither is motivated by "invidious
discriminatory animus" nor is "as pervasive or as ingrained in
the social fabric" as historical examples of overt racial discrimination.242 Remedial race-conscious action also contributes positively to the public policy goals of attaining political advancement for minorities and "eradicat[ing] [] debilitating
stereotypes" over the long term. 243 In turn, scholars have further
238 Jason Rathod, A Post-racial Voting Rights Act, 13 Berkeley J Afr Am L & Pol
139, 159 (2011) (quotation marks omitted).
239 See, for example, Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation,88 Va L Rev
951, 958 (2002).
240 See Part III.C.
241 See Strickland, 556 US at 34-35 (Souter dissenting) ("A crossover is thus superior to a majority-minority district precisely because it requires polarized factions to
break out of the mold and form the coalitions that discourage racial divisions.");
Rathod, 13 Berkeley J Afr Am L & Pol at 191-93 (cited in note 238) (criticizing the
creation of majority-minority districts because they "create environments obsessed with
race," "reward race-baiting candidates and punish post-racial candidates," and "elect
candidates who lack the cross-racial appeal to win statewide races").
242 Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action Issue: Law, Policy, and Morality, 22 Conn
L Rev 323, 353 (1990).
243 Randall Kennedy, Persuasionand Distrust:A Comment on the Affirmative Action
Debate, 99 Harv L Rev 1327, 1329 (1986).
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argued that the advancement of these goals comports with the
pluralist-democratic vision that lies at the core of the nation's
founding-a vision that "treats as primary the values of including all members of the polity and treating them as equal, coparticipants in constructing the fundamental values of the polity."244
Thus, in addition to the legal grounds for judicial recognition of the § 2 defense, there exists strong normative support for
the defense's recognition from pragmatic, consequentialist, moral, and political perspectives. The open question for the future,
then, is not whether courts can or should begin to acknowledge
the § 2 defense, but whether they will in fact rise to the occasion
and begin to implement it in the courtroom-and if so, when.
CONCLUSION

This Comment addresses the legal and historical bases that
states may use to deploy § 2 of the Voting Rights Act as a defense against claims challenging district plans as racially discriminatory. In addition to the doctrinal support that exists for
judicial recognition of the § 2 defense, normative reasoning also
indicates that it is imperative that states have the § 2 defense at
their disposal. Absent the defense's availability, states have no
legally cognizable means of taking proactive measures to avoid
or remedy a potential § 2 violation.
In addition to arguing in support of the § 2 defense's availability, this Comment also considers how courts would apply the
§ 2 defense in practice. It advocates for a regime in which courts
evaluating the merits of the defense in the equal protection context would not grant deference to state legislatures' determinations of whether a given district plan was necessary and narrowly tailored to avoid a § 2 violation. Finally, and perhaps of most
practical import, this Comment calls on states to create coalitional districts as a means of avoiding violations of both § 2 and
the Equal Protection Clause. In combination, judicial recognition of the § 2 defense and states' reactive creation of coalitional
districts would help to "hasten the waning of racism in American politics"-the ultimate ideal of § 2 itself.245
244 Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role of
the Judge in a PluralistPolity, 58 Md L Rev 150, 207 (1999). For arguments that remedial race-conscious government action plays a role in advancing pluralist-democratic
ideals, see id at 249-67; Brooks, 22 Conn L Rev at 367 (cited in note 242).
245 Strickland, 556 US at 25 (Kennedy) (plurality), quoting De Grandy, 512 US
at 1020.

